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I.
THE origin and development of the writ of quo min(s is bound up with
the history of the English Court of Exchequer. The latter originated
as a tribunal specializing in matters of the royal revenue. Its intimate
connection with the financing of government accounted for the rigidity
and the promptness which characterized its procedure. Private creditors
were naturally anxious to avail themselves, for their own purposes, of
such expeditious judicial proceedings, which in origin and purpose were
in the nature of a royal prerogative. They found the court responsive
whenever interests of the royal treasury even were indirectly at stake.
Sufficient interest of the treasury could be established when the plaintiff
was a debtor to the king and, unless aided by the court against the
defendant, would have been the less able to satisfy the king ("
quo minus sufficiens existit . . . "). This two-fold assertion of a
plaintiff, first to be a debtor to the king, and second to be the less able
to satisfy the king, was deemed justification enough for the Court of
Exchequer to intervene by issuing a writ called the writ of quo mh;ins.
Assumption of jurisdiction by the Court of Exchequer by means of
the writ of quo minus inevitably led to conflict with the jurisdiction exer-
cised by another court- that of the Cuurt of Common Pleas. The
determination of civil suits instituted by one subject against another was
the particular domain of this court. An exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court of Exchequer in what would in substance appear to be a common
plea would necessarily involve a concurrence of jurisdiction, and whether
or not this constituted an unlawful encroachment on vested monopoly
rights of the Common Pleas became the subject of perennial dispute.
Ultimately the Court of Exchequer won a complete victory and developed
from a special forum of private character into a full-fledged superior
court of general jurisdiction. The outcome was mainly due to the force
of the writ of quo minus.
It is therefore surprising that the writ of quo mints has as yet not
been favored with the degree of attention on the part of legal historians
that it deserves, in view of its important part in the development both
of the Court of Exchequer generally and of the characteristic features
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of Exchequer procedure.' Sometimes the writ is distinguished by epithets
such as the "famous," the "well known" or the "peculiar" writ of quo
minus, but altogether knowledge of the writ has increased but little since
the time when Blackstone characterized it as based on an outright fiction,.
on a "bare suggestion" that was never controverted or scrutinized, an
empty formula serving as a pretext for the Court of Exchequer to vindi-
cate its jurisdiction over any kind of civil action.2
Blackstone's statement describes the law as it existed at the time he
wrote. It has the force of expert testimony on the practices of his epoch
and as such it is confirmed by his contemporaries and successors.8 The
approach today, more than a century after the replacement of the writ
by more modern forms of procedure,4 is naturally different. The historian
is interested in a more complete picture of the writ as it unfolds through
the course of the centuries. The jurist is interested in observing the
operation and natural growth of any specimen of legal fiction. They are
so interested not only because of curiosity and antiquarianism, not only
because of the conspicuous role which legal fictions play in the modern
technique of legislative drafting, but because they are aware that legal
history, no less than political history, repeats itself. It is quite con-
ceivable, for instance, that the rules on which present federal jurisdic-
tion is grounded, may at some remote date of progressing nationalization
and in defiance of constitutional structure, evolve in the direction of
procedural fictions in a process bearing a close resemblance to the story
of quo minus. Hence there is justification for an examination into the
question whether current textsr' are entirely correct in depicting the writ
1. Cf., e.g., the venire facias ad respondendumn and the extent in aid, which used the
quo minus wording, although the term "quo minus" was commonly reserved to the capias
ad respondendmn. See 1 MANNING, THE PRACTICE OF THE OFFICE OF PLEAS oR COUNT
OF CO 1.M-MON PLEAS IN THE EXCHEQUER AT WESTMINSTER (1819) 8; see note 89, infra.
2. 3 BL. Commai.* 45 et seq., 286. For the form of the writ, see BL. CoMM.* App.
xiX.
3. 1 BACON, ABRIDGMENT (6th ed. 1793) 598 el seq. Here the editor, Cunningham,
(as against the author himself) speaks of a "common fiction." See also WEST, EXTENTS
(1817) 253.
4. The Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Will. IV., c. 39, § 1 (1832) substituted the
simpler writ of summons, reproduced in TroD, THE PRACcE OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS
OF LAW (1833) 72, 262.
5. Cf. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (1st ed. 1905) 315 et seq., 317, n, 1; (2d ed.
1914) 267 et seq.; PLUCKNET, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Com.,moN LAW (1936) 146,
possibly based on the quotation in 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed.
1922) 240. In the same connection, see Y. B. 20 Edw. III, pt. 1, 16-20 (erroneously:
116), i.e., the case of Barton v. Pouche (1345/1346). Plaintiff in this case actually owed
the king (queen) a sizeable sum for a quantity of wool, and the defendant, a foreign
merchant, owed plaintiff a share of this very amount. Defendant's attempt to wage his
law was rejected because the king was "in a manner party." There was a genuine debt
to the king (queen), and this gave the Exchequer justification to hear the case. There
is no trace of a jurisdictional irregularity. Nor, incidentally, of the quo minus formula.
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of quo minus as a fictitious and ingenious, if not crooked, device applied
by an over-ambitious tribunal to "steal" jurisdictional power from other
courts.6
There certainly was a time when that was true. Yet possibly this is
only a part of the picture. Fictions, particularly of a rather complicated
nature, usually do not originate by spontaneous generation. There is
cause for suspicion when the writ of quo minus is placed, as it were,
by the side of the Latitat and similar artifices in the chamber of pro-
cedural horrors. True, as early as the 13th and 14th centuries the records
bristle with complaints, royal writs and statutory measures showing that
the Court of Exchequer often took cognizance of "common pleas." But
too little justice is done to the jurisdictional difficulties facing the court,
in the sweeping statements which appear, for example, in 1MCKeehnie.
Plucknett, and Baldwin,' to the effect that the plain intention of the
statutes "was always defeated by the ingenious use of legal fictions"
(M1cKechnie), of which the "well known" fiction of "Crown debtors"
was the most popular.
The main task and purpose of the Exchequer and its court was to
collect royal revenues. If this could be done most effectively by assisting
a king's debtor in collecting his owvn debts, the court would act only
in keeping with its original charter in granting this assistance. Naturally,
such action would involve the hearing of a plea between subject and sub-
ject. But it comes near to the problem of squaring the circle if a court
on one hand is especially created to secure the promptest collection of the
king's debts and on the other is deprived of any power to further the
solvency of the king's debtors. It is just as understandable for the barons
of the Exchequer to insist on their implied power to serve their royal
master by all available means, however indirect, as it is for the debtors
of a common person to insist that their creditor is not the king himself,
but merely one who happens to be indebted to him and who, therefore,
ought to be referred to the Court of Common Pleas. Where jurisdictional
powers thus overlap already by their very definition, the proposition that
the writ of quo minus was and always has been a fictitious contrivance
calls for particularly strong and unequivocal evidence. It is not sufficient
to show that a private creditor was allowed to invoke the Court of
Exchequer against his debtor, if, when doing so, he was actually indebted
to the king. To that extent the exercise of jurisdiction by the Exchequer
Hence this case offers no support for the proposition that there %%-as a fictional quo smil-s$
in use by the middle of the 14th century. Cf. also BAM.nwrx, , KnG's CoUNcIL (1913)
218 et seq.; and Lt.mw A.xD BnALwur, SErxcr CASEs BrrorE rH Kixo's COUNCIL
1243-1482 (1918) liii, liv. The cases on pp. 13, 16, 17 are claimed unjustly to liint t0
"pretexts," "fictions" or similar devices.
6. J N.Ks, SaoRT HisToRy oF ENGLtsH L.w (4th ed. 1913) 171, 354.
7. See note 5, supra.
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Court is incidental to its very reason for existence. Nor is a showing
conclusive that private persons sometimes attempted to qualify for a
privileged status by becoming a "servant" to an Exchequer official.' Even
if this were merely a subterfuge, without proved connivance of the
court, such a practice would, on the contrary, tend to indicate that the
Exchequer of Pleas was entirely averse to legal fictions. Hence what
we really want to see is whether a private creditor, actually not indebted
to the king, could sue his debtor in the Court of Exchequer by merely
alleging, suggesting or pretending to be a debtor to the king. We are
satisfied that such a stage was reached by the middle of the 18th century
(Blackstone). But we are not satisfied that even then the quo minus
formula was a permitted untruth in every case and form of its ramified
application. Much less are we satisfied that it had been so from the days
of its origin.
The most careful and recent investigations into the origin of quo mius
have been made by Gross 9 and Jenkinson.'0 The two cases in which
Gross attempts "to find statements pointing to the existence of the well-
known doctrine or fiction on which the modern writ quo minus was based"
are, it appears, devoid of any inkling of quo minis. Further, these cases
reflect a categorical refusal to take cognizance, precisely because the
plaintiff was unable to prove his privilege. In one case' the defendant
pleaded, in the other 2 the plaintiff admitted upon the court's explicit
inquest, that there was no indebtedness to the king. The result in both
cases was a dismissal of the suit.
Jenkinson admits that his endeavors to find the origin of quo minus
were fruitless: "We have searched in vain both the Plea Rolls and the
Files of Writs of our period for the famous writ Quo minus; to which.
. later authorities assign so much importance . . . We are reason-
ably convinced, therefore, that it is the product of a later age." Jen-
kinson sees what might be called the origin of quo minus in the suits a
plaintiff could bring jointly with the king ("una cum"), or in part pay-
ment ("in partem solutionis") of his debt to the king, cases in which
obviously the king had somehow to be actually interested in the matter.
"Possibly the introduction of the vaguer quo minus wording, when the
date of that can be established, will be found to mark the stage at which
fictional use became common."
8. BALDWIN, op. cit. supra note 5; JENxiCNSoN, SmELcr CAsES IN TIE ExCnEQUrR
OF PLEAS (1931) xcix denies a general use of the device as a fiction. See also GROSS, op.
cit. infra note 9, case no. 6: the suit of a would-be servant is dismissed because it was
found that plaintiff "non est de gremio scaccarii."
9. GRoss, The Jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer under Edward I (1909) 25
L. Q. REv. 138 et seq.
10. JENKINSON, op. cit. supra note 8, at c et seq.
11. No. 2, 11 Edw. I., GRoss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 139.
12. No. 5, 12 Edw. I., GRoss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 139.
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The conclusion candidly drawn by Jenkinson and based on a systematic
search of the records contrasts favorably with the vague and vain attempts
to label the writ as the creature of an early period by methods of purely
intuitive estimation. It seems, however, that the records of the 13th
century so far as they have since been made available in printed form
yield enough evidence to furnish a more tangible clue to the early years
of quo minus. Once its sources have been brought to light, there remains
only the task of tracing it down through the centuries, as briefly and
summarily as space may permit, and in conclusion to reduce the fictional
theory to the dimensions warranted by historical facts.
II.
In endeavoring to trace the writ of quo minus to its initial stage, we
cannot be content to find some mode of procedure that, as an institution,
will come as close as possible to the effect and the functions of quo mi nus.
We, therefore, cannot stop short at proceedings such as "una cum" or
"in partem solutionis." Our interest is concentrated on the most con-
spicuous features of the writ: the words of quo mimns from which it
derives its name, and the underlying idea of extending a royal privilege
to a common person lest the royal revenues be adversely affected. It is
noteworthy that neither the wording nor the purpose of the writ are in
any way inherently restricted to judicial proceedings: any officer entrusted
with the collection of debts to the king is a conceivable addressee of an
order sounding in quo mnus. Thus we must be prepared to extend the
search beyond the boundaries of strictly judicial action into the general
administrative machinery of the Exchequer.
Madox. the inexhaustible source of information on the early Exchequer,
would not seem at first blush to encourage a digression from procedural
into administrative law. 3 He neither raises the question of the origin
of quo minus, nor does his material permit of any conclusion as to the
answer. However, his work contains a precious, though rather cryptic
hint. Mladox, while dealing with the prerogative of the king to collect
debts owed to the king's debtors, quotes a great number of examples
taken from the reigns of Richard I and Henry III. These writs are
mainly addressed to the sheriff, directing him to distrain on the debtors
of the king's debtors. Sometimes they are addressed to the barons of
the Exchequer requesting their assistance. They do not often contain
anything beyond the strict order. Occasionally, however, the writ becomes
a trifle more eloquent:
"Summers. & Dors. Mandatum est eidem, quod distringat debitores
Herberti filii Mathaei, ad reddendum arreragia quae ei debentur, de
tempore quo idem Herbertus filius Mfathaei fuit Vicecomes in ipsis
13. 2 MAox, HISTORY AND AnTourrms OF THE ExcHEqUYRE (1711) 119 ct seq.
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Comitatibus, ne pro defectit etc. T. P. Grimb (aud) xxv die Novem-
bris Ex Memor. 25.H.3. Rot.3.a." 14 (Italics supplied).
This "ne pro defectu" appendix is interesting, because a sentence intro-
duced by such phraseology promises just that kind of motivating reason-
ing which characterizes the quo minus formula. The mysterious "etc."
which appears in this phrase, if of any significance at all, may probably
be taken to conceal a thought that had already found stereotype expres-
sion, held no longer worth while reiterating. A glance at the Close Rolls
covering the first third of the 13th century readily shows why the ver-
batim quotation of the "ne pro defectu" clause could be abandoned. It
was quite customary for the royal writs of that time to use rather drastic
language in order to impress the addressee with the importance of swift
compliance: ". . . ne pro defectu sui ad eum rex se graviter capere
debeat" is a favorite formula."a Sometimes the tone is slightly milder:
S .. sciturus quod, si hoc facere distulerit, offensam regis gravem
incurret, quam rex non poterit dissimulare",' ° or " . . . ita quod pro
defectu solutionis non oporteat nos ulterius inde scribendo laborare".1 7
Hence, facing in Madox a "ne pro defectu" clause in connection with
a situation that we are accustomed to associate with the writ of quo
minus, one is entitled to presume that the phrase behind Madox's enig-
matic "etc.", once this word is deciphered, promises an interesting con-
tribution to the history of the writ.
Indeed, a collection of records some ten years older than the one
quoted by Madox seems to unveil the secret: the Memoranda Roll of
the King's Remembrancer for Michaelmas 1230-Trinity 1231.18 It con-
tains at least three writs ending with the "ne pro defectu" clause and
shows it in its full and most instructive length, as applied in favor of
debtors to the king:
1. "Notigham. Rex vicecomiti. Precipimus tibi quod sis in auxilium
Petro de Goudington' ad distringendum milites suos in comitatu
tuo ad reddendum ei scutagium suum de scutagio nostro de Kery
de feodis que de ipso tenea(n)t et ipse de nobis in capite in ballia
tua. ne pro defectu tui remaneat quin Petrus nobis inde sufflcienter
respondere. Teste ut supra."' 9 (Italics supplied).
14. Id. at note (e). The writ is an order to distrain the debtors of Herbert, the sou
of Matthew, for certain arrearages, "lest through a fault, etc." Cf. also id. at notes (w)
and (z).
15. Cf. C. R. 14 H. III, m. 4d (1229/30); C. R. 15 H. III, m. 7, 2d, 8d, 9d, 17d
(1230/31); C. R. 17 H. III, m. 6d (1232/3); C. R. 18 H. III, m. 32 (1233/4).
16. C. R. 15 H. III, m. 8 (1230/1).
17. Id. at m. 7d.
18. 11 PUBLICATIONS OF THE PIPE ROLL SocIETY (N.s., Robinson ed. 1933).
19. Id. at 57. The sheriff is ordered to assist a tenant in capite in distraining his
subtenants, "lest through your fault Peter be unable to satisfy (lit.: sufficiently to an-
swer) us."
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2. The second writ of this kind is addressed to the sheriff of Middle-
sex, directing him to assist the king's debtor Hugo de Hodeng' in col-
lecting the scutage owed him by his tenants: "no pro dofotu Lui remanat
quin ideu Hugo izobis possit de debitis que nobis debet suffcieuter respon-
dere."'1 2 (Italics supplied). Lest through a fault of yours my debtor should
be unable to give me entire satisfaction! It is nothing short of the quo
mims idea in a slightly modified form. All that may remain to be desired
is the use of the very term "quo minus" in the place of at least one of
its equivalents: "quin" or "ne".
3. We need not search very far to discover this last link in the chain.
It is supplied by the wording of the third writ of the category:
"Suhamt'. Mandatum est vicecomiti quod distringat omnes debi-
tores Gileberti de Stapelberg (Stapelford?) ad reddendum ei ar-
reragia que ei debentur sicut rationabiliter monstrare poterit quod
ei debeantur de tempore quo fuit vicecomes in conitatu Suhamton'
pro venerabili patre R.modo Dunelmensi episcopo. ;o pro defcite,
tui remaneat quo minus (!) sufficiontor nobis respondere possit de
debitis nostris que exiguntur ab eo in eodem comitatu per sum-
monitionem scaccarii nostri de eadem tempore. Teste W.xxvo die
Octobris anno xiiijo."12C (Italics supplied).
Again a "ne pro defectu" clause. This time, however, we learn that
the word "etc." in Madox's reproduction stood not only for the idea
of quo minuts expressed in some c4ognate wording, but for the quo miuts
formula itself, and that in a shape to which the Blackstonian sample
would be the closest simile. Thus the five hundred years separating the
reign of George II from that of Henry III apparently have not brought
about more than an insignificant change in the context. No matter how
much the substance of the institution and its practical use may have been
affected by so considerable a lapse of time, as a matter of form the
change, if any, is so slight as to warrant the conclusion that what Black-
stone quoted as the writ of quo minus has a family tree pointing with
a reasonable degree of certainty straight to the year 1230. The frequency
with which the writ appears in its then obtaining form makes it even
probable that it originated at some earlier date, and that by 1230 it had
already reached a secured degree of currencv.2
20. Id. at 78.
21. Id. at 76, another order of the same Lind, but with the important %ariation:
lest through your fault he be the less able sufficiently to answer us for our debts
." For a writ of similar context and of the same time, see Paxca. TEATN:s o:z THE
LAW OF THEr ExCnEQER (1830) 527, n. 1.
22. In fact, its most characteristic elements are quite common in the administrative
language of the early 13th century. For "ne pro defectu," see note 15, Su pra. "Ne re-
maneat" appears already in Rot. Lit. Cl. 6 joh. m. 1; "sicut rationabiliter monstrare
poterit" in Rot. Lit. CI. 6 joh. m. 19 and m. 26; 15 Henry III. m. 17.
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But even if the year 1230 does not mark precisely the debut of the
writ, it seems reasonably safe to say that this type of command to the
sheriff to assist a royal vassal in distraining his sub-vassals is the real
origin of the writ of quo minus as it is later used to initiate judicial
proceedings. The most reliable authorities on the law of Exchequer pro-
cedure agree in characterizing and defining the writ of quo ninus as a
distringas "in aid of persons chargeable with duties or services to the
king" (Price)." This is exactly what our samples represent: distringas
in aid of the king's debtors.
It would be a tempting task at this juncture to enter into an examina-
tion of the formal problems connected with the records. The entries
appear on the Roll of the King's Remembrancer. Are we to infer that
this official actually issued the writ, or did he merely record a writ issued
by another official, be he a member of the Exchequer or possibly the
chancellor? Available material is too scant to admit of more than mere
speculation. Antedating the Cowick ordinance of 1323 (defining the
powers and authorities of the remembrancers) by nearly a century,
2'1
these records are the product of an epoch in which the Exchequer had
become neither completely emancipated from control by the Chancery,2"
nor had yet achieved a clear division of functions within its own organ-
ization. We know that by 1230 there were writs issuing from and sealed
with the seal of the Exchequer,2" that even the Dialogus already speaks
of certain "brevia regis de exitu thesauri".2" Yet we also know that often
the same category of writs (e.g., "liberate") would issue from Chancery
or from Exchequer, 28 and in vain do we look to the testc of the docu-
ments for a helpful indication in any one direction. The issue-
original, judicial or administrative writs - is further confused by the
circumstance, to which Maitland2" calls attention, that "a group of what
we may call fiscal or administrative writs have obtained admission among
the writs by which litigation is begun."10 (Italics supplied).
23. GILBERT, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE COURT or EXCHEQUER (1738) 18, 41;
PRICE, op. cit. supra note 21, 526 et seq.
24. Cf. TouT, THE PLACE OF THE REIGN OF EDWARD II IN ENGLISH -IISTORY (1936)
176. For the text of the ordinance, see 3 THE RED BOOK OF THE EXCHEQUER (Hal's ed.
1896) 848 et seq.
25. POOLE, THE EXCHEQUER IN T E TWELFTH CENTURY (1912) 189.
26. Pat. R. 14 Henry III, m. 3 (1229/30) calls them "brevia . . . nostra de Scaccarlo
que prius consueverunt sigillari prefato sigillo nostro de Scaccario."
27. 1 DIALoGus DE Sc.cCAIuO vi.
28. MADOX, HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE EXCHEQUER OF THE KINGS OF ENG-
LAND (1769) c. X, § 13; DiALoGus (Hughes, Crump and Johnson ed. 1902) 82 1. 18, n.
29. Maitland, History of the Register of Original Writs, 2 SELECT ESSAYS Ix ANGLO-
AmmICAN LEGAL. HISTORY (1908) 549 et seq., 559, 560, 563, 572.
30. According to Maitland, op. cit. supra note 29, at 559, the Chancery in the early
13th century was accustomed to perform much of its purely administrative and fiscal work
in quasi-judicial forms. These variegated writs found a place in the Registrum Brevium
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Hence the formal and more technical aspect must remain an open
question. It suffices for present purposes to have satisfactory evidence
that already the year 1230 witnessed an "extra-judicial," "fiscal or ad-
ministrative" writ which in its wording and its function may be considered
as the direct precursor of what was later termed the judicial writ of
quo minus. In two respects the features of the early quo minus are
remarkable: first, "quo minus," expressing as it does nothing but a
motive for an order, not the order itself, carries with it the potentiality
of a transplantation into any other domain where its peculiar reasoning
may appear to be equally valid. It is adaptable to judicial as well as
original writs, to actions no less than to orders of execution, to extents
no less than to common pleas. Second, there is as yet nothing fictitious
about it: in all of the three cases of 1230-1231 there was a debt actually
due to the king, justifying this summary and prerogative procedure.
There is a strong and clear showing that the proceeding enured to the
actual benefit of the king, and there is no warrant to question that the
king's debtors were in acute difficulties to pay off their debts unless they
were helped by a powerful arm to collect their own claims. The writ of
quo minus in its initial phase thus expresses the quo minus idea in all
its true and natural meaning.31
III.
The proceeding by which the king collected his debts" - was always a
highly privileged one, and the 12th century, marked by the development
of an increasingly powerful machinery of financial administration, left
in this respect a heritage of lasting value. Even Magna Carta, while
attempting to restrict the royal power to impose feudal exactions, did
Originalium, although only a small part of them really deserved this name. In the Irish
Register of November 10, 1227, Maitland found under no. 44 "a xrit forbidding the
sheriff to distrain R.... to render ten marks to N., for which he is neither principal
debtor, nor pledge; but 'this writ does not run in privileged cities, or .-.here the debtor
is the King's debtor'." From a register of a somewhat later time (the middle part of
the reign of Henry III) Maitland mentions (under no. 78) a writ to the "Sheriff to aid
in distraining villans to do their services." Hence the Distringas in aid of our periol
does not seem at least to issue exclusively from the Exchequer. On the function of the
sheriff to assist tenants in distraining their rear-vassals, see Mtnpis, Tuir- 'EPtiveL
ExIGLISH SERFF (1927) 260.
31. 3 THE RED Boox OF THE ExcHEqum (Hall's ed. 1896) 830, contains a writ
of 3 Edw. I. (1275) granted to the executors of a king's debtor to stay proceedings
against them by other creditors, in view of the royal prerogative to be satisfied first:
the deceased's goods "nullatenus distrahi debeant quouinnus integre debita nostra pos-
sumus hab~re." The writ is interesting because here the king's debtor appears not as
a creditor, but as a debtor to others, and this again is considered as a suitable occasion
for the display of royal prerogative under the heading "quominus."
32. Cf. Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Laow (193S) 33 CoL. L
REv. 555 et seq., 575, n. 55.
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but little (cf. cc. 9 and 26) to hedge the act of distraint with a minimum
of legal safeguards. In substance it remained after 1215 the same
prerogative to practically unfettered self-help that it was prior to 1215.
It was but natural that debtors to the king, when either passing on
their own burdens to their vassals or imposing on them new and inde-
pendent charges, were anxious to secure for their own benefit the aid
of this royal prerogative by applying to the king for the sheriff's assist-
ance in distraining their debtors. The king had a two-fold interest to
accede to such requests: the fee paid for the grant of the license and
the desire to protect his own resources in preserving the solvency of his
debtors.
The writ issued on such occasion is, as we saw, the origin of the
quo minus formula. From there it is only a small and entirely logical
step to the point where the king's debtors seek to obtain a similar enjoy-
ment of quasi-delegated royal privilege during the stage of judicial pro-
ceedings instituted to secure a judgment against their own debtors. The
Court of Exchequer did not hesitate to follow the administrative tradi-
tion of assisting the king's debtors in collecting their debts. In doing so
it adopted the underlying principle and reasoning of this tradition. More-
over, the continuance of a time-honored practice was emphasized by a
perpetuation of that very form, the use in court of the quo minus wording
itself.
The exact period when the quo minus language of extra-judicial acts
begins to gain a foothold in court proceedings is as yet unascertained. 3
But judging by later text writers, the 14th century would seem to be
responsible for the definite introduction of quo minus into the judicial
proceedings of the Exchequer. Aside from a recurrent quotation of a
case decided in 10 Edward III (1336) 34 to the effect that a defendant
in a quo minus suit would not be allowed to wage his law, we are referred
to at least three cases as being early samples of quo minus proceedings."
Yet one should not overlook the fact that these references tinder the
33. The formula "in partem solutionis" to which Jenkinson calls attention as a
possible predecessor to quo minus proceedings appears likewise in extra-judicial writs,
probably considerably earlier than it does in court. See C. R. 17 H. III, m. 17
(1232/3): "mandatum est P. de Rivall' quod c. et 1. li . . . liberet Petro Joiberti . . .
in parte solutionis annui feodi sui"; and THE GREAT ROLL OF THE PIPE FOR TIlE 26TIL
YEAR OF HENRY III 1241-1242 (Cannon's ed. 1918) 13: "Idem vicecomes . . . de catallis
que fuerunt Herui de Stafford' que debent allocari in parte solutionis debitorum ipsius
Herui sicut continetur . . ."
34. BROOKE, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT (1586) "Quo minus," no. 5, referring to
FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT (1565) "Ley," no. 66.
35. FITzHERDERT, op. cit. supra note 34, "Ley," no. 52; 38 Lib. Ass. 20 (1364/5)
and BROOKE, Op. cit. supra note 34, "Quo minus," no. 6; Y. B. Mich. 44 Edw. III, p. 43,
pl. 54 (1369), considered as a case of quo minus by BROOKE, at "Quo minus," no. 1;
BROWN, CO-MPENDIU.M OF THE SEVERAL BRANCHES OF PRACTICE IN TUE COURT OF EX-
CHEQUER (1688) 12; 18 Vl\ER, ABRIDGMENT 152 (2d ed. 1791-5).
[ Vol. 49: 39
HISTORY OF QUO MINUS
heading "quo minus" belong to writers of a period when quo minus
already was current. Their purpose is practical usefulness rather than
historical exactness. For this reason a careful distinction must be drawn
between the language of the reports and that of the textbooks. The fact
situations in all three cases are certainly suggestive of a classification
sub titulo "quo minus," but they are no less compatible with the older
form of "una cum" or "in partem solutionis," actions lacking the quo
minus element. In fact, the case referred to by FitzHerbert as decided in
20 Edward III (1346) is the same as the one quoted by Holdsworth in
a similar connection - Barton v. Pouche.0  As explained above, it is
an outright action in partem solutionis for a debt ultimately due to the
king (queen) and with no vestige of a quo minus wording. The case of
Y.B. 44 Edward III (1370) reported at length, cannot be vindicated
for the quo minus class either. The plaintiff "pria briefe pur le Roy, et
lui mesme" (asked for a writ for the king and himself), which seems
to indicate an "una cum" action." No turn of words in the report evokes
the characteristic consideration: that without a remedy in Exchequer
plaintiff would be the less able to satisfy the king. Hence both the case
of 20 Edward III and of 44 Edward III apparently owe their later class-
ification as quo -in us actions to a misleading anachronism rather than
to historical interpretation.
The transition from the frequent type of "una cum" and "in partem
solutionis" actions to the regular quo minus species is probably best and
most reliably represented by a case decided in 38 Edward III (1364).3s
In following Brooke's explanation, confirmed as it is by the report
(though the latter is somewhat distorted by clerical errors), we would
not hesitate to classify it under the heading "quo minus": "Prior farmor
le roy fuit appele in leschequer de rfid al roy de - det, il dit q J.S. fuit
indetted a luy sine q il ne poet satisfycr al roy, & pria pces vs luy, et
habuit, & il fuit agard' de rfid, qd. nota."3' (Italics supplied). Here a
debtor to the king seeks to draw his own debtor into court clearly and
solely on the ground that otherwise he would not be able to satisfy the
36. See note 5, supra.
37. Y. B. Mich. 44 Edw. III, p. 43, pl. 54 (1370).
38. 38 Lib. Ass. 20 (1364/5). 2 MADox, op. cit. supra note 28, at 79, n. y, quotes
an interesting trespass case argued in the Exchequer. It dates from 45 H. III (12A/5)
and is thus exactly one hundred years older than 38 Lib. Ass. 20. The defendants were
alleged to have prevented a sheriff and his aids from distraining: ". . . quo rrws
potuerunt facere districtionem pro debitis Domini Regis:' Unfortunately the qu,,tation
is not very clear as to the person of the plaintiff: the King himself or one of his d01 t.irs.
At any rate the case constitutes an important connecting link between the extra-judicial
and the judicial quo minus and one of the earliest available.
39. A prior, farmer to the king, was called to the Exchequer to answer the king for
his debt; he said that J. S. w-as indebted to him 7'ithout wchich he was unable to satisfy
the king, and he asked for process against him, which w\as granted and it %%as held that
he answer, which note.
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king. The case is remarkable for its genuine expression of the quo mims
reasoning and for its hybrid character combining quo minus with una
cur in making the defendant answerable to both the king and the plain-
tiff. But there is a third reason why it might justly be called a leading
case in this field. It is one of the early authoritative judicial utterances
on the recurrent question of Exchequer jurisdiction as a matter of prin-
ciple. Under the so-called Statute of Rutland, "no Plea shall be holden
or pleaded in the Exchequer aforesaid, unless it do specially concern
us and our Ministers aforesaid."40 Yet when does a plea cease to "con-
cern us?" The question was not answered by this or subsequent statutes,
and so the court could lay down an extremely broad rule of jurisdiction:
"Car de tout ceo q touche Le Roy, et puit torner en avitage de lly,
de haster sa besoigfi, no' prendrom' conisance."'
In asserting so extensive a jurisdiction, the court is in full accord with
what Britton defined as the task of the Exchequer: ". . . to hear and
determine all causes relating to our (the king's) debts and seignories
and things incident thereto, without which such matters could not be
tried; and that they have cognizance of debts owing to our debtors by
means whereof we may the more speedily recover our own.""2 The high
authority which Britton enjoyed throughout the middle ages contributed
to counterbalance the legislative attempts to tie the court down to strictly
fiscal matters and enjoin it from holding "common pleas." Such also
was the effect of the king's own practice to allow private individuals,
as a matter of personal favor, to sue their debtors in the Exchequer.
40
These factors may have facilitated the occasional misuse of Exchequer
jurisdiction, and by questioning altogether the authority of the "Statute
of Rutland" it could retrospectively indeed appear to Chief Baron Saun-
ders 44 that the Court of Exchequer had always been, as of right, a court
for all common pleas.4' The records, however, yield no indication beyond
40. Statute of Rutland, 10 Edw. I, § 11 (1281/2).
41. "Because we will take cognizance of anything affecting the king and of what
may be to his advantage and further his purposes." Translation.
42. Britton I 5, (Nichols and Baldwin ed. 1901) 265, to which passage Pnicwu, op.
cit. supra note 21, at 8, n. 3 refers as the obvious "foundation of the civil jurisdiction
of the Exchequer of Pleas."
43. 2 MADOX, op. cit. supra note 28, at 76.
44. Dissenting in Stradling v. Morgan, 1 Plow. 208 (1560).
45. Naturally, abuses originated mostly from the creditor's side. As a matter of
curiosity, however, it may be noted that debtors seemed to develop a similar predilec-
tion for the Exchequer and thereby tended to contribute to the growth of abusive prac-
tice: a statute of 1 Rich. II, c. 12 (1377/8) had to ordain "that if any at the Suit of
the Party judged to another Prison for Debt, Trespass or other Quarrel, will confess
himself voluntarily and by a feigned Cause (1), Debtor to the King, and by that Means
to be judged to the said Prison of the Fleet, there to have greater Sweet of Prison (I)
than elsewhere, and so to delay the Party of his Recovery, the same Recognisance shall
be there received, and if he be not Debtor to the King of Record, his Body shall incon-
tinently be remanded to the Prison where he was before. .. ."
(Val. 49: 39
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the fact that Exchequer jurisdiction was asserted if and only if the king's
interest seemed to be somehow involved in the case.
The report in 38 Lib. Ass. 20 does not disclose the text of the writ
granted in order to bring the defendant into court. It may or may not
have used quo minus language. The records of the 15th century fill this
gap. They show that quo mims has as yet no stereot3pe wording. It
flexibly adapts itself to the particular situation and appears then in at
least three different contexts:
1. Quo minus debitum regis solere poterit, in the case of a monk
suing, without his abbot, as debtor to the king;,"
2. Quo minus rex feodi firmam habere non poterit, to enable the
grantee of a royal franchise to redress an infringement; 4
3. Quo minus debita recusat solvere, to enable a plaintiff, contrary
to the rules of common law, to sue the executor of his deceased debtor
on a simple contract, provided the plaintiff is indebted to the king.43
Looking to the procedural peculiarities of the quo niues writ, the rule
established in the 14th century, that the defendant was not admitted to
wage his law, seems to have been questioned in a case of 4 Edward IVWA
However, the weight of authority continues to be against wager of law
46. Y. B. Hit. 8 H. V, p. 6, pl. 23 (1421). Some twenty actions of the same ind are
reported by the clerk of the pipe to have been pending at the time. The same year stands
on record for another interesting quo oinius decision: an executor suing in quo v:ilms
and alleging that he is the less able to satisfy the king must make the allegation ex-
plicitly qua executor, since he could not use (as is presumed) the money recovered as
executor in order to satisfy the king for a debt he owes in his individual capacity. Y. B.
'Mich. 8 H. V, p. 10, p1. 19 (1420) and FrrzHnaERT, op. cit. supra note 34, "Briefe," no.
891, reappearing literally in Savile, no. 88, at 39 (1581/2). This formalistic rule con-
tinued to be observed in the 17th century. See Swan v. Porter, Hardres C0 (1656) and
the advice given by BRowN. TaE ENMING CtrUens VA t MEcuT. (1678) 216. An ad-
ministratrix has to declare: the intestate . . . "qui obiit intestatus Debitor Domini
Regis . . . Quominus etc. pro debito dicti intestati . . ." The holding of Y. B. Mich.
8 H. V, p. 10, pl. 19 (1420) may evince an acute sense for technical pleading, but it cer-
tainly likewise illustrates a tendency on the part of the court closely to scrutinize private
litigations submitted to its jurisdiction.
47. Y. B. Hil. 32 H. VI, p. 24, pl. 7 (1454). The report expressly adds: "et cest
brief issist hors del exchequer" and thereby removes any doubt that the writ of qua
minus then was issued as a judicial writ by the Court of Exchequer, not as an original
writ issuing from Chancery and returnable in the Exchequer, the reason being, as pointed
out by Piscx, op. cit. supra note 18, at 14, that the "Exchequer of Pleas was never rec-
ognized as an open King's Court for the holding of common pleas."
48. Y. B. Trin. 11 H. VII, f. 26, pl. 9 (1496). This privilege was later contro-
verted in Y. B. Trin. 27 H. VIII, p.23, p1. 20 (1535), but reaffirmed in Information
against Bates, Lanes 22 (1606). It depended upon the plaintiff suing as king's debtor
(supposant q ieo sue in det al roy") or, according to the probably correct version in
Fleetwood's edition of the reports (London 1679), upon his being a debtor to the king
("supposant q jeo sids in det au Roy").
49. Quoted in Y. B. Hil. 32 H. VI, p. 24, pl. 7 (1454).
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in quo minus proceedings."° In view of the reason originally alleged for
this rule, the predominant interest of the king, it may not be amiss to
interpret this as a further circumstance tending to show that the use
of quo minhus was then reserved to cases of genuine indebtedness to the
king.
This impression is corroborated by what information the records yield
on the fate of quo minus in the course of the 16th century, or more
precisely, in the era of Queen Elizabeth, since the reign of her father
was rather unenlightening on this point. The Elizabethan period shows
the writ in a state of widespread use and reflects with more clarity than
any preceding century the attitude of the courts as to the scope of this
remedy. The Exchequer case of Stradling v. Morgan, decided in 1559,
is the first and (with one later exception) probably the most elaborate
judicial review and clarification of the law of quo minus:
"The Exchequer is not a Court for Common Pleas, but it is a
Court for the King's business only, that is, touching the revenues,
debts, and duties of the King. But no plea between common persons
shall be held there, unless for a person privileged there, as officers
that attend upon the Court, the absence of whom (as they would be
absent if they were impleaded elsewhere) would be prejudicial to
the business of the King in the said Court, and therefore for the
King's benefit and to dispatch his business in the same Court the
officers and ministers of the Court shall sue there . . . And so shall
one that is indebted to the King by sltrmise of quo minus, etc.
• . . and the reason is, because the King shall have execution of the
thing and damages recovered in the quo minus, towards satisfaction
of the debt which the plaintiff owes the King: so that the plaintiff
in the quo minius partakes of the King's prerogative, and the King
shall have benefit by the suit . . . And in all these . . . cases the
plaintiff, in order to give jurisdiction to the Court, ought to make
his surmise, and (I) shew the cause, viz. that he is privileged, or
indebted to the King . . . But in the principal case the plaintiff
has brought his action, and has not made any surmise to entitle the
Court to jurisdiction. And without surmise the jurisdiction shall
not be taken away from other Courts and given to this Court . . .
for the penalty here and the action for it is only given by the Act
to the party, and nothing is given to the Queen, for which reason
the Court without surmise or (1) cause shewn has no more cause
to hold plea upon it than it has upon an action of debt brought upon
an obligation . . . "r" (Italics supplied).
50. See FITZHE3ERT, op. cit. supra note 34, "Ley," no. 66. For a later period, see
Slade's Case, 4 Co. 95b (1602), and Le Grand Case in Le Court Gards, 2 Roll. 294
(1622) ; BROWN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 11-12.
51. 1 PLOW. 208 (1560), dealing also with the disputed authority of the so-called
Statute of Rutland.
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The opinion certainly does not clear up the entire complex of juris-
dictional problems incident to the writ of quo mninus. It is ambiguous
inasmuch as it requires, at one time, both a surmise and a showing of
cause with regard to privilege, and at another time allows either one.
It further fails to separate the two issues evoked by the quo mviuts
formula: the "surmise" to be a debtor to the king from the surmise
of "quo minus", i.e., the suggestion by a plaintiff who actually is a
debtor to the king to be the less able to satisfy him. At any rate, it
adds to the sporadic utterances scattered in the reports of two precedent
centuries the all-important and eloquently emphasized rejection, on princi-
ple, of a general common pleas jurisdiction of the Exchequer.
Whatever suspicion remains as to the willingness of the court to ask
for nothing more than a purely formal surmise of quo vints or a surmise
to be the king's debtor is removed by the inferences to be drawn from
Savile's Reports on Exchequer cases of 22, 24 and 25 Elizabeth (1579-
1582). In these three years no less than six cases appear in the books.
in which the privilege of suing as a Crown debtor has been flatly denied.
True, it does not appear in how many cases of the same years the
obviously increasingly popular writ was allowed. But the reasons for
denial of the privilege of suing as a Crown debtor indicate a sense of
critique that is scarcely compatible with a desire on the part of the court
to meddle with the jurisdiction of other courts. In Raqland -,. Wild-
goose plaintiff sued as debtor to the king. - He substantiated his claim
of being a Crown debtor by adding that he owed the king the sum of
£300. The defendant, anxious to escape the jurisdiction of the court,
paid the £300 into court and asked to be dismissed. The problem -was
a delicate one. The court might have felt inclined to keep a jurisdiction
that was unchallenged and unquestionable when the action was instituted.
It did this, in fact, in a later case. 3 In the Ragland case, however, it
followed the defendant's argument: the privilege being grounded on a
debt to the king vanishes with the debt; "quia cessante causa cessat
effectus." In the case of Lowe,14 a clerk to the King's Remembrancer.
plaintiff brought an action jointly with his wife, an executrix under the
will of one Jenings, for a debt due by the defendant to the testator.
Privilege was denied - the privilege of a clerk was likewise asserted
by quo minits- because the debt accrued to the plaintiff's wife as execu-
trix only. In Brinklow v. Perne the plaintiff alleged to be a debtor to
one Gray, erst-while searcher of London." It was held that Gray indeed
had the assistance of the court since he was indebted to the Queen; but
as he had died, his privilege ceased, whereby the plaintiff likewise lost
52. Savile, No. 27, at 11 (1579).
53. Savile, No. 77, at 33 (1581/2).
54. Savile, No. 49, at 20 (1581).
55. Savile, No. 107, at 51 (1582).
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his privilege as a Crown debtor. Sometimes a party attempted to found
a privilege on the ground of a suit pending in the Exchequer Chamber.
Chief Baron Manwood, who did not mince words"' to assert the juris-
dictional powers of his court, was just as vigorous in his refusal to take
cognizance of framed privilege actions: "Ne fuit unqs view que un suit
la comenced per English Bill donera cause de priviledge in cest Court.
Per cest means chescun party que est sue in London poet exhibit un
English Bill sur un feyned cause, avera priviledge." ' His words are
a valuable contribution to the validity of the fiction theory as applied
to the 16th century.
We may conclude this series of cases with a case that is just as typical
of the then prevailing tendency among creditors to sue in the Court of
Exchequer, as it is of the still impeccable correctness in the court's atti-
tude. An information was brought against a usurer. He pleaded "not
guilty," but in an attempt to make the most of his predicament he sued
one of his debtors in the Exchequer claiming the privilege of being a
Crown debtor, since the Crown proceeded against him for a fine. Again
it was Chief Baron Manwood who made it clear to the plaintiff that the
court would not allow the privilege to be diluted by technical niceties. 8
He found one clear way for plaintiff to obtain privilege: to plead "guilty"
in the information proceeding. Otherwise, he added, the court would
feel that the plaintiff would rather lose his privilege than lose his money I"°
A new variation of quo minus prevails throughout the reign of Queen
Elizabeth: quo minus nobis (or: dominae Reginae) satisfacere valeat
(whereby he is less able to satisfy us). This is the form both of the
writ6" and the bill 6 of quo minus.
56. Manwood is reported [Savile, No. 101, at 47 (1582)] to have said: "Et il dit, it
ne veia alcun reason pur que le Court d'Exchequer ne serf de cy grand authority come
autres Courts sont, car ii prist ceo destre pluis auntient quant les autres Courts, que le Roy
doet aver revenue devant il avera divers Courts, que sans revenue il ne poet aver officers;
et pur ceo le Court que fuit pur le revenue est plus auntient, & quant le revenue in-
crease les Courts increase."
57. Savile, No. 108, at 51 (1582). "It is unheard of that a suit instituted there by
English Bill should give privilege in this Court. By such method any party sued in
London may exhibit an English Bill on a feigned cause and would have privilege."
Translation.
58. Savile, No. 112, at 53 (1582).
59. The increasing frequency of quo minus suits accounts for an increasing number
of cases in which Chancery is requested to stay quo minus proceedings. See Jones v.
Whitney (1578) in BRoWN, Cr.zax's TUTOR IN CHANCERY (3d ed. 1705) lxix, and
WEST, SYMBOLWoGRAPHY (1611) pt. II, 276-285, for the excerpt of a similar case pend-
ing between 1592 and 1596.
60. Hunt's Case, 3 Dyer 328 (1573). Compare the situation discussed in note 31,
supra. Hunt's Case is noteworthy because it rejects a King's debtor's claim to a privi-
lege to be sued only in the Court of Exchequer. He was sued in Common Pleas. The
Court of Exchequer later joined in denying this privilege.
61. Pelham's Case, 1 Co. 3b (1588). The report is the first to show the complete
text of a bill of quo minus.
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To sum up the observations from the records of the 16th century: the
writ of quo minus has become a widely used instrument to sue in the
Exchequer. The court,* however, visibly withstands the temptation to
compromise with creditors and expand its jurisdiction. Faithful to the
doctrine laid down in Stradling v. forgan, it will look for the benefit
of the Crown. 2 If it is discernible, it will not be allowed to suffer by
too strict an interpretation of technical rules." If it is absent, the party
will be referred to another court."4
With the 16th century furnishing strong evidence of a well controlled,
genuine and undistorted use of quo ninus, and with a "fictitious" quo
minus in full swing during the 18th century, the 17th century remains to
furnish some clue to the turning-point. In search of it we would, how-
ever, do well to recall the peculiarities of the quo mins writ as compared
to the misused bill of AMiddlesex, the Latitat and other devices. The writ
of quo minus as a writ ad respondcndum had for a long time offered
creditors a remedy more advantageous and more expeditious than those
of other courts: there was no wager of law, no fine, or no discriminately
high level of costs and its use was nationwide. In other words, it had
many qualities to make it an instrument attractive to creditors, which
explains why creditors tended to encourage the court to expand its juris-
diction. On the other hand, in certain respects debtors were treated better
by the Exchequer than by other courts, in others, no worse. There was
no outlawry in the Exchequer; wager of law was gradually obsolescing
in general, and the Latitat had become an efficient means to remove
territorial obstacles of jurisdiction. Hence, taking quo nintus as a mere
instrument to bring a defendant into court (as against a summary means
of execution), a wider use of the writ would be likely to pas- without
public opposition, and even meet the wishes of a large part of the public.
Earnest opposition to an expansion of Exchequer jurisdiction was to
be expected only from the Courts of Common Pleas and King's Bench.
However, it so happened that these courts were then engaged in a
vigorous struggle against each other, concentrating their efforts on mar-
shalling legislative help to settle their own internal disputes. The atmos-
phere was-thus most propitious, around the middle of the 17th century,
for a smooth and untroubled intrusion into the jurisdictional area of the
other superior courts. It was probably not so much a greed for power
that induced the Exchequer to follow the signs of the time, but rather
a very marked sense of its own dignity 0 as the "most ancient" court
62. Where the king's benefit is visible, the concurrent jurisdiction of the Exchequer
is also recognized by other courts. Cf., e.g., Caudrey's Case, 5 Co. [EccL L.] 161 (1595).
63. 2 Dyer 174a (1559/60).
64. Sparrie's Case (1590), 2 NEmsoi;, AnrRa=nrmN, "Privilege," (1726) 1297, no. 2.
65. See note 56, supra. But see also Robinson, Anticipations n:dcr the Commor-
wealth of Changes in the Laa, 1 Szrxcr EssAYs =x AxGLO-AmUCA:i LAL HisTornt"
(1907) 467, 477, speaking of "covetousness rather than desire to amplify jurisdiction'
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that would not allow its members to stand aloof while King's Bench, the
same court whose supremacy the Court of Exchequer had refused to
recognize as early as the middle of the 14th cehtury, 0 was successfully
striving to increase its prestige.
These conditions account for the absence of any "6clat" centering
around the transformation of the Exchequer Court into a general court
of common pleas. Further, the development was accelerated and facili-
tated by several other factors.
First, increasing refinement in the art of pleading tended towards
production, at the earliest possible stage, of the crucial issue. This implied
the elimination of any secondary or "collateral" matter. Coke's report
of Bellamy's Case shows in a significant dictum that the basic quo minus
allegations were considered as "collateral." "If the Kings Fermor bring
a Quo minus in the Exchequer, he ought to alledge that he is the Kings
Fermor to enable him to sue there; but he needeth not to shew it to the
Court, for that it is meer collateral to the Action." 7 (Italics supplied).
No authority is quoted for this view, but since it serves the purpose of
an analogy drawn from the practice of courts other than Common Pleas,
it cannot be a novwm, it must be assumed to reflect a known rule of
Exchequer pleading. 68 The treatment of an issue as "collateral" will of
necessity gradually turn the collateral allegation into a mere "suggestion,"
"surmise," "supposition," current in so many other proceedings of the
time.
Another procedural peculiarity must also have been instrumental in
bringing about the change. It cannot be overemphasized that a plaintiff's
allegation of being a debtor to the king was the assertion of a personal
privilege. Now it seems to have been the general practice for courts to
reserve the question of privilege to their own and uncontrolled determina-
tion. "The Privilege is not traversable and triable per Pais, but a matter
of Law of which we take Notice." 9 This tendency of the courts to
remain each their own master in matters of privilege 0 is obviously the
66. When jurisdiction of review from the Court of Exchequer was withheld from
King's Bench and given to the council. See 31 Edw. III, c. 12 (1357) and WILKINSON,
STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CN-
TURIES (1937) 124 et seq.
67. Bellamy's Case, 6 Co. 38b (1605). Coke in no way hints at a fictitious use of
quo inbus: "He that is a Farmer, or indebted to the King, for the King's more speedy
satisfaction of his debt or duty, shall sue his debtor by a quo minus in the Exchequer."
2 COKE, IxsTIuTTs (1642) 551.
68. As further illustrations, see Sharpeigh v. Waller and Bromley, Co. Ent. 42 (1609),
and Jones v. Hughes, id. at 49 (1607).
69. Kirkham v. Wheely, 3 Salk. 281 (1695). Cf., however, The King and the Earl
of Banbury, Skin. 517 (1694), restricting nontraversability to privileges provable by
record.
70. As said by Chief Baron Eyre in Cawthorne v. Campbell, 1 Anst. 205 (1790):
"In theory, every Court is properly the judge of its own privilege, and no other Court
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theory on which the Exchequer proceeded to extend its common pleas
jurisdiction. The general acceptance of the principle made it difficult if
not impossible for other courts to interfere.
Lastly, it was a fortunate circumstance for the Court of Exchequer,
once it was bent on increasing its power, that its jurisdiction was law-
fully grounded on a personal privilege whose vagueness and elasticity
permitted the inclusion of anybody owing the Crown any amount, how-
ever small, in taxes, duties or excises. And if the privilege could not be
denied to an intentionally or inadvertently tardy taxpayer, was it not
repugnant to withhold it from the individual who had been conscientious
enough to pay his dues punctually? It is not difficult to see the immense
potentialities inherent in the very concept of "Crown debtor," particularly
at a time when commerce was developing and former feudal aids, reliefs,
scutages and tallages were being replaced by a general system of taxation.
True, the Court of Exchequer probably welcomed so indefinite and com-
prehensive a privilege and was none too anxious to curtail it. It was more
promising an implement of expansion and at the same time was clothed
with a more attractive appearance of legality than the many furtive
devices, such as "ac etiam" and the like, resorted to by the other courts.
And yet, before accusing the court of outright "usurpation,"' it is ap-
propriate to remember that the Exchequer of Pleas, since Britton's time,
was lawfully entitled to favor the "king's debtors." If this concept itself
in the course of the centuries underwent an unforeseen process of ampli-
fication, fairness would require a due discounting of the magnitude of
political and economic changes and an abstention from ascribing their
consequences solely to human malignity. Such an attitude would seem
to be better in tune with the acts and reactions of the contemporaries:
there is nothing in the legislative records of the 17th century to support
the view that in the public opinion of the time the Court of Exchequer
was transcending the authority sanctioned by century-old tradition. 2-
ought to interfere with it . . . There is no Court that suffers its process either to b2
insulted or to be materially interrupted."
71. As was done even by the Exchequer Chamber in Attorney Gen'l v. Hailing, 15
%f. & W. 687 (1846).
72. Tow.-ards the end of the reign of James I, a bill was under consideration "for
Restraint of Assignments of Debts to the King; and for Reformation of Abuses in
levying of Debts for Common Persons, in the Name and under the Prerogative of the
King.' 3 Joup. HousE OF L. 398 (May 21, 1624). Yet as shown by notes of contemporary
reporters [cf. Conniwo Debates z6ai (1935) 2 YATMn HIsr. Pu . 1541, the abuse of royal
prerogative by alleged debtors to the Idng referred to devices used in order to become
debtor, not to quo minus as being at the disposal of everybody. Also the bill, which, in-
cidentally must have fallen in oblivion, seems mainly to have been directed against ill-
practice in the field of Extents. An attempt to include quo minus in the procedural reform
of 1692 (4 & 5 IV. and M., c. xviii) failed on account of opposition by the Commons
(Hist. 'Mss. Comm. 14th Rep. App. Pt. 6 no. 693 and no. 701). Again the alleged abuses
had no connection with the use of the term "Crown debtor" as a fiction but referred to
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In reviewing the law of quo minus procedure, Le Grand Case in lte
Court Gards is rather picturesque in its emphasis on the fiscal origin.
It continues to call it a "remedy de recover les debts le Roy, car ceo est
le increase de son Treasury, et que est le Treasury est le strength de
le Roy, et que est le strength del' Roy est vinculum pacis et nervus belli
le overflowing fountain de son beneficence et benevolence . . . ,,3
But all that the reports have to offer by way of confirming this idea
are empty technicalities of pleading. In Barnehurst v. Cabbot the de-
fendant objected, though in vain, that "the plaintiff alleged himself to
be a debtor to the protector without more, and does not say of Eng-
land." 74 One cannot help feeling that a defendant who has to resort
to that kind of exception would be glad to challenge the plaintiff's capacity
as a Crown debtor, if there were room for such a defence. Yet, as is
said in Wilkins v. Shalcroft,75 it suffices for a plaintiff "to call himself
debtor and accountant without more."
Where a plaintiff sued not as debtor and accountant but merely as the
king's debtor ("quo minus per debitorem domini Regis"), the defendant's
attorney, Holt, successfully asserted his client's Oxford University privi-
lege, and he did so on the ground of an argument that makes us pause:
"A quo minus is not a writ or bill of privilege, nor is it so called; as
when privileged persons sue in the courts where they are privileged
. if the plaintiff were an accountant and entered upon his account,
that would alter the case . . .But a quo minus is now(I) but a common
action here . . . "" (Italics supplied). As a matter of legal theory
the attorney's version may not have been quite correct, as Chief Baron
Hale was quick to point out. But if an outstanding lawyer in 1670 could
call the quo minus action brought as the king's debtor a common action
(as against the action of a privileged person), adding that this involved
a change as compared to some preceding period ("now"), and if an
authority of Hale's rank adopts the argument in much of its substance,
then it seems safe to say this: whatever evolution the writ of quo minus
must have gone through, it had by 1670 ceased in practical effect to be
a writ of privilege, so far as Crown debtors were concerned.
The latter restriction is noteworthy. Limits had to be set to the process
of profaning what used to be a genuine privilege. The concept of privilege
still remained vital to the jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court. It was
much more so than at Common Pleas or King's Bench, where privilege
jurisdiction was but an appendix to the normal scope of power. Hence
the exaction of unduly high bail. VERNON, CONSIDERATIONS FOR REGULATING THE EX-
CHEQUER (1642) is a careful enumeration of all the grievances caused by Exchequer
procedure. Quo minus is not among them.
73. 2 Roll. 294 (1622).
74. Hardres 5 (1655).
75. Hardres 188 (1661).
76. Castle v. Lichfield, Hardres 505 (1669).
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the obvious care with which the court deals with the problem of privilege
at precisely the same time as the writ of quo vzi us through a coaperation
of heterogeneous causes undergoes a far-reaching process of transforma-
tion. The Exchequer feels that unless it keeps the revenue jurisdiction
well under control, it has to face the danger of losing it to other courts.
It also feels that in order to gain and maintain power in the normal case
of a common plea, it may be necessary or at least wise to yield some
of it in the exceptional one, as was done by Hale in view of the Oxford
University privilege. These considerations are more or less discernibly
reflected in the court's attitude to the problem of extent, and so are they
in its rulings on questions of privilege. It is not necessary to dwell upon
all the details of the privilege complex. They are elaborated in Alderma;n
Lan gham v. Baker,77 Baker v. Len thaI,7 Carterelt v,. Massa;n,70 and
Claphanz v. Lenthall. ° These cases have retained their authority for
more than a century, as shown by Cazk'tlornC v. Campbell.8' In substance
they represent a careful "weighing" of privileges in other courts, as
compared with Exchequer privileges, and an attempt to set up a kind
of hierarchy among the latter, the lowest in rank being the so-called
"general" privilege of the Crown debtor. It is a privilege to sue, not
to be sued, and is defeasible by any, special privilege of the defendant
in another court. This sacrifice of the Crown debtor privilege whenever
it is challenged by an adverse genuine privilege is the rather modest
consideration the Exchequer imposes on itself in the tacit and advanta-
geous compromise ending its struggle for the power of Common Pleas
jurisdiction.
In the course of the 17th century the practice of Exchequer procedure
has attracted the interest of textvriters more frequently than during
the precedent centuries. But surprisingly enough, they are even less
responsive to our query than the reports. Sheppard makes a distinction
worth remembering: in order to institute a suit of quo minus, plaintiff
must be a debtor to the king (Sheppard evades, however, the critical
question of proof) ; if he is a debtor to the king lie "may surmise that
for the wrong which the defendant doth to him, he is less able to pay
the King his Debt or Farm, and this shall give that Court Jurisdiction
to hear and determine that Cause."'8 2 (Italics supplied). Here the two
basic allegations of the plaintiff are clearly separated.
The most detailed available work on the practical routine of Exchequer
procedure is an unpublished, undated, anonymous manuscript on the
77. Hardres 116 (1658).
78. Hardres 117 (1658).
79. Hardres 316 (1662).
80. Hardres 365 (1664).
81. 1 Anst. 205 (1790).
82. SHEPPARD, GRA1ND ABm hTum-E (1675) 126. Cf. also SsA'i'Pn, Eprro!sn (1655)
807.
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"Rules and Orders made by the Barons for regulating of Proceedings
in the Office of Pleas of the Court of Exchequer" and observations on
"The Practice of the Office of Pleas". Its date may be approximately
established between 1635 and 1640.3 Yet in spite of all the eloquence
it displays, all the valuable clerical data, the minute description of the
practical side, including the costs, and all the historical explanations, the
fundamental question on the fictional nature of the quo minus allega-
tions is not answered or even mentioned. Occasionally the author uses
the suspicious locution that a clerk may "make himself" a debtor. He
also reproduces the wording of the writ showing that it has not con-
siderably changed since the reign of Queen Elizabeth: quo minus nobis
satisfacere valeat still being the nucleus. But the problem of proving the
plaintiff's capacity as Crown debtor obviously does not occur to him.
This silence is likewise a characteristic feature of Brown's instructive
book on Exchequer practice, published in 1688.4 A defense questioning
the plaintiff's quality as debtor to the king is discussed neither under
demurrer, nor under pleas to the jurisdiction, nor under pleas in abate-
ment, nor finally under pleas to the person of the plaintiff."" With the
exception of a single and rather unenlightening sentence summarizing
the old case of 11 H.7.26,8" there is only one significant contribution to
the problem, and this is in the preface to the book:
"That this Court was at first instituted onely for the Conveying
the King's Treasure and Revenues into his Coffers, is not much to
be doubted. However in process of time the Wisedom and Care of
our Ancestors hath likewise been to add two other Branches to its
Jurisdiction for the Benefit of the Subject, viz. that of Equity, in
the nature of the Court of Chancery, and the Office of Pleas, for
Actions at Common Law between Party and Party. In which Office
moreover there is provided this conveniency . . . that the Quo-
minhus goes every where throughout the Kingdom of England, and
Dominion of Wales . . . , As being supposed (1) to be always
brought by one who is Debitor Dordii Regis." (Italics supplied).
83. The author mentions neither the Commonwealth, nor Charles II, nor James II,
but only James and Charles. One of the forms he recommends for practical use is dated:
"28* die NovemP An* regni Dili Caroli nunc (1) Regis Angl. etc. io.2" On tile other
hand there is no reference to the important rules of 15 Charles I.
84. BROWN, COMPENDIUM OF THE SEVERAL BRANcHEs OF PRACTICE 1i TiiE COURT OF
ExCHEQUER (1688).
85. Salkeld, at 2 Salk. 462, mentions a case [Wilson v. Rookes] where defendant
delivered to the Barons a writ termed "dummodo non tangit nos," wherein it is stated
that the Crown is not interested in the suit. The Court ignored it: "There is such a
Writ in the Register, but there are several Writs there which no Usage or Precedent
does warrant, of which this is one." The court suggested, however, that the defendant
might have pleaded the matter to the jurisdiction.
86. "One who is indebted to the King by Surmise of a Quo minus may have the
privilege of this Court" (p. 11).
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Everything here hinges on the right interpretation of the term "sup-
posed." It may be meant as a prerequisite, but it may with at least equal
right be taken as a legal term: to accept without further proof.
Thus the documentary evidence of a metamorphosis of quo inhus
during the 17th century is rather tenuous and circumstantial. Judging
by the judicial records it may satisfy the requirements of a prima facie
case that by the middle of the century, possibly somewhat earlier, the
plaintiff's two allegations (of being a debtor to the king and less able
to pay the debt) had become a matter of mere form: the allegations
were indispensable, but as such they were sufficient and unchallengeable.8 1
IV.
What is called the "writ of quo minus" was a means to bring a defend-
ant into the Court of Exchequer. Among the other writs in use during
the 18th and 19th century for the purpose of commencing an action in
the Court of Exchequer was one likewise applying the quo mines word-
ing: the venire facias ad respondendum. It similarly issued at the suit
not only of a real but also of a supposed debtor or accountant of the
king."8 The historical connection with the interest of the king had evap-
orated to a mere verbal reminiscence. A private suit in the Court of
Exchequer was no longer a matter of personal privilege.
But that was not true for every kind of proceeding in which the quo
ndn us clause was traditionally adopted. The "distringas in aid" of old
was not perpetuated in the diluted and perverted writ of quo minus,
but rather in the so-called "extent in aid.': This was a summary pro-
ceeding for collecting the debt owed to a person who in his turn had
formally recognized to be indebted to the Crown.82 It anticipated the
final judgment by immediate execution, though it provided for an oppor-
tunity for the suffering party to come into court and raise all the defenses
he may have had against his creditor and many of those his creditor
would have had against the Crown. In view of its nature as a serious
and dangerous weapon, the interested parties (either the debtor to a
crown debtor or the assignees of a bankrupt debtor) would use every
means in their power to obtain redress. They would request the Court
of Exchequer to set the extent in aid aside or they would apply to
Chancery for relief on the ground that the extent in aid ought not to
87. On q~w nminus practice in the l8th and early 19th century, see 3 BL ConimP 270
e seq.; 1 TIDD, PRAcnICE (9th ed. 1HS6) 38 c seq.; id. at 92, 155 c seq. TwD, FronLxs
(6th ed. 1824) 72, 79.
88. 1 MANNING, PRACTICE OF THE OFFICE OF PLnAs oR CoUMr oF CoMo:N Pn-ns IN;
THE EXCHEquFR AT s'%WE sTF.R (1819) 8.
89. On its technique and history, see EVsT, A TREATisE OF THE Lwi AziD PRmcTic=
oF ExzN-rrs (1817) 11 et seq., 252 et seq.; CHrrr, PnmoGATIVEs or T= Cnowi- (1SO)
261 et seq., 317 et seq.; GILBERT, A TREATIsE 01 THE CoUTr oF ExCHE2UER (1758) 167
et seq.
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have been issued. The tenor of these motions was precisely what we
were searching for in vain during the later stage of quo minus proceed-
ings. An extent in aid was only granted to a confessed Crown debtor.
A second prerequisite was an affidavit signed by the latter, to the effect
that without the extent against his own debtor he would be less able
to pay off the Crown debt. Hence our interest may be focused on the
attitude of the courts - Exchequer and Chancery - to defenses chal-
lenging either the capacity as a Crown debtor or the "less able" affidavit
or both.
In only one case did Chancery go so far as to disregard the unques-
tioned quality of a person as Crown debtor and to compel him to refund
what he had lawfully obtained from his debtor by means of an extent
in aid, on the ground that he had sufficient estate of his own to satisfy
the king's debt. ° The decision was consciously made as a policy decision
against the abuse of extents in aid by wealthy creditors, which had become
"a great oppression in the city." Later trend of authority discloses a
marked attenuation. In Dickinson v. 311olineutix (1692), Brown and
Sandys v. Trant et al.92 (1701), Brown v. Bradshaw 3 (1701) and lastly
in Phillips v. Shaw94 (1803) Chancery expressed its unwillingness to
undo what the Court of Exchequer deemed proper and just. Its attitude
may be briefly characterized in two propositions: the assurance to be a
debtor to the Crown will be closely examined; only a genuine Crown
debtor may claim the privilege of an extent in aid. The assurance, how-
ever, to be less able to satisfy the Crown unless an extent in aid be
granted, is a matter of the Crown debtor's conscientious but, in effect,
uncontrolled personal judgnient, i.e., for all practical purposes a mere
flourish.
This represents in substance the Exchequer Court's own view. In
The King v. Blatchford (1792) the Attorney General explains why the
"less able" assurance should be taken for granted: "It would be absurd
to expect the immediate debtor of the Crown to swear that the debt
of the Crown is in danger, or that he himself is in insolvent circumstances.
It is sufficient if he swear that this part of his funds is in danger.""9
This is certainly an overstatement. A prerogative process might per-
fectly well be restricted to cases of acute repercussion from the ultimate
debtor's default on his creditor's ability to satisfy the Crown. In fact,
by a rule of the Court of Exchequer of 1822, it was ordered that no
fiat for an extent in aid should be granted unless the prosecutor made
90. Capell v. Brewer, 1 Vern. 469 (1687).
91. Pre. Ch. 47 (1692).
92. 2 Vern. 426 (1701).
93. Pre. Ch. 153 (1701).
94. 8 Ves. Jr. 241 (1803).
95. 1 Anst. 162 (1792).
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affidavit that without extent in aid the Crown debt would be in danger
• of being lost to the Crown. 0 Chief Baron Eyre, therefore, relied merely
on old Exchequer usage in rejecting the motion to set aside the extent
for insufficient proof of the "less able" allegation." On the other hand,
the contention to be a debtor to the king was not allowed to become a
matter of mere form. The court would interpret the concept in a wide
and generous sense,"5 but it would be inclined to deny the privilege
wherever the Crown debt had been satisfied by either the immediate"3
or the ultimate" ° debtor, or where the Crown debtor ekes out sundry
small arrearages of income tax and excises to support his application. 10'
It is always aware of the "most mischievous consequences"' 1°2 that any
relaxation in this respect would engender: "All that we have to look to is,
to prevent our process being abused."'10 3 This leitnotiv is at the root
of various secondary rules: e.g., not to have the sheriff pay the proceeds
over to the creditor (instead of the court) unless by special leave of
the court, 04 and not to allow an extent in aid for a larger sum than is
owed to the Crown, unless the creditor's claim is indivisible."0 As was
said by Chief Baron Hale:
91" . . to make the King's prerogative instrumental, and become
a stale to satisfy other men's debts, would be unreasonable, incon-
venient and mischievous to the subject."' 00
V.
In summary, a survey of the authorities on the "well-known fiction"
of quo minus seems to justify a double conclusion:
1. The writ of quo minus originated in an extra-judicial practice of
distraint in aid, traceable to the beginning of the 13th century and based
not on a fiction, but on a genuine debt to the king. Nothing then warrants
the suspicion that this debt was but a pretext to secure the assistance
of the sheriff. When adopted by the Court of Exchequer the writ con-
tinues for several centuries to presuppose a genuine debt to the king.
96. See 23 Eng. Rep. 595, ed. note.
97. See also Rex. v. Taylor and Newman, Bunb. 127 (1723).
98. The King v. Rippon, 2 Pr. 398 (1816) ; Rex. v. Williams, 3 Pr. 75 (1816). Com-
pare also the statutory change brought about by 57 Geo. III., c. 117, § 4 (1816).
99. Rex. v. Clarke, Bunb. 221 (1726).
100. The King v. Hopper, 3 Pr. 40 (1816).
101. The King v. Wilton, 2 Pr. 363 (1816).
102. Ibid.
103. Barlow v. Hall, 2 Anst. 461 (1793).
104. WEsT, op. cit. supra, note 89, at 264; CHrrT, PnRno.ATrIVS OF .TrIF Crnow-;
(1820) 317.
105. WEST, op. cit. supra, note 89, at 273.
106. Att'ney Gen'1 v. Poultney, Hardres 403 (1665).
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But the plaintiff's allegation of being less able to satisfy the royal treasury
does not appear to have ever been subjected to judicial examination. By
the middle of the 17th century, possibly somewhat earlier, the plaintiff's
capacity as a Crown debtor likewise ceased to be scrutinized.
2. The extent in aid preserved the historical quo minus features and
carried them over to the 19th century. No extent in aid was available
without proved debt to the Crown. The "less able" allegation was mostly
taken for granted by the courts. But at the beginning of the 19th
century even that practice was abandoned and quo ndmis was restored
to its true and literal meaning.
